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Though the UNHCR in South Africa go to great efforts to be neutral and provide
the best possible assistance to those seeking refuge, by design they have to work
together with the Home Affairs department. In practice this means that asylum
seekers and refugees will often see them as co-responsible for the government
(in-)actions. This piece looks at UNHCR and their roles in humanitarian relief,
refugee protests and potential encampment policies, to reflect on their relationship
with the South African government as well as refugees in the country.
Though UNHCR is celebrating their 70-year anniversary, this is much shorter in
South Africa. It has been 28 years since they first formally opened their offices in
the dying days of apartheid in 1993. The prior apartheid regime refused to sign
the 1951 Geneva Convention, and instead followed a heavily securitised migration
regime based on racist principles of white supremacy. Under the new post-apartheid
leadership of Nelson Mandela, the Geneva Refugee Convention was signed in 1995
and promulgated in early 1996. By the late 1990s, South Africa offered one of the
strongest refugee protection system in the world: incoming asylum seekers would
have the right to work, to study and to move freely around the country in a system of
local integration.
Fast-forward nearly 30 years and UNHCR is teaming up with the Department of
Home Affairs (DHA) to embark on the ambitious project of seeking to clear up
a backlog of asylum-seeker appeals and decision-making, which a recent audit
noted would otherwise take up to 68 years. By hiring an additional 36 lawyers and
technical assistance from the UNHCR, the project aims to clear a backlog of 163,000
applications in just four years.  This project is essential to the wellbeing of asylum
seekers in the country, who according to a recent study from Amnesty International
have to wait up to 19 years to get their final decision on their refugee status. It will
also hold important political repercussions, with over-reporting in asylum-seeker
and refugee numbers, as well as widespread narratives of the abuse of the asylum
system leading to a heated political situation that has repeatedly spilled over into
xenophobic violence against refugees and other migrants.
On the backlog project, the UNHCR will be working together with Home Affairs
department. The DHA is increasingly moving away from the progressive rights of
refugees, most recently with new amendments from early 2020, which restrict the
right to work and political activity of asylum seekers in several ways. Though the
post-apartheid leadership of Nelson Mandela propagated Pan-Africanism and a
generous refugee system was developed during this time, from the outset refugees
felt that the DHA had been ‘captured’ by their ‘enemies’. From the first minister of
home affairs, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, to the current Minister for Home Affairs, Aaron
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Motsoaledi, there is a long history of ministers who publically decry refugee rights at
best, with xenophobic comments against refugees and other migrants at worst.
Despite all their efforts to be neutral and provide the best possible assistance to
those seeking refuge, the UNHCR has to work together with the DHA. In practice
this means that asylum seekers and refugees will often see them as co-responsible
for the government (in-)actions. Their limited muscle to act in a highly politicised
context of refugee protection, like in South Africa, thus undermines their ability to
provide protection and relief, at least in the eyes of refugees. This will be shown by
discussing the UNHCR role in providing humanitarian assistance, recent refugee
protests and the question of resettlement as well as their clear(er) stance on
processing camps. The blog piece will then conclude with a reflection on the future
relationship between the DHA and UNHCR.
Humanitarian assistance
The UNHCR provides assistance only for the most vulnerable refugee and asylums
seeker populations in South Africa. For example, they have provided 30,000 persons
of concern emergency assistance during the pandemic. Nonetheless, like elsewhere
in the world, they suffer from severe underfunding. The most recent update, which
considers the last quarter of 2020, shows a 97% shortfall in their funding for the
region. Since UNHCR also mostly works through implementing partners like the
Jesuit Refugee Service, the institution has become largely invisible.
In research conducted for a project on the political stakes of refugee protection, a
human rights activist in Musina in March 2020, noted “where is the UNHCR; they
are nowhere to be found?” Similarly, in a focus group with refugees in Musina, also
in March 2020, one of the participants explained “for example, in our countries like
the DRC… UNHCR supports too much [sic] the refugees. But here in South Africa, I
can’t see any support of UNHCR.”
The inability of the UNHCR to take on a vocal role of showing their place means
that their work is often misunderstood, including by parliamentarians. In a committee
hearing on home affairs in 2019, one MP noted that South Africa as a member state
contributed money to UNHCR, so “it was incumbent on the UNHCR to assist them
[ refugees] or to offer them humanitarian assistance. It was not the duty of South
Africa to do so.” In 2019, South Africa contributed $19, 481 to the $8.636 billion
budget of UNHCR.
Protest and Resettlement
Beyond the general question of humanitarian assistance, the UNHCR has more
recently become a central stakeholder in a very politicised refugee-led protest. In
late October 2019, a group of over 600 refugee protestorsgathered in and occupied
a public square outside the UNHCR offices and later a church in Cape Town (as
well as for a short period in front of the UNHCR head office in Tshwane, though this
group was quickly evicted after it tried to storm the UNHCR offices).
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The refugee protestors deemed they were no longer safe due to repeated incidents
of xenophobic violence in the country, and asked to be resettled to a third country
for their own protection. UNHCR was quick to communicate that resettlement cannot
happen on such a group basis, and that they would need approval of the third
countries in any case. The situation escalated over months, with the protestors
reported to have used violence and the threat of violence against some of the
persons attempting to mediate the situation. It took the COVID-19 country wide
lockdown in April 2020 for the final eviction of the protestors to two different camps.
By October 2020, the DHA said they were ready to deport some of these protestors.
UNHCR-spokespeople have been busy toeing a sensitive line between the demands
of the protestors and the actions of the DHA, noting they are ready to assist
with reintegration in the community or repatriation to countries of origin, whilst
calling on the South African government not to fail on their commitments to non-
refoulement. According to our recent research, the DHA has blamed UNHCR for the
events having grown out of control. The City of Cape Town in turn states that the
responsibilities of these refugee protestors lies with the DHA. Politicians have urged
all of these actors, including the UNHCR, the DHA and the city council to work more
collectively on the Cape Town protest issue. The actors note they all have different
mandates.
What this incident brings out is  the inability for the UNHCR to make vocal
remarks on these issues, without being seen to be taken side. Protestors noted
in a newspaper report: “We are questioning why in other countries the [refugee]
commission is active when it comes to refugee problems but here they are silent”.
Processing camps?
One area where the UNHCR has taken a stronger stance is on the issue of a
potential encampment policy for South Africa. The most recent revamp of the
South African migration and asylum system is spelled out in the 2017 White
Paper on International Migration. The paper proposes the idea of “asylum seeker
processing centres” in border areas, to register and house asylum seekers whilst
their application is processed by the DHA, in what can be equated to a type of
administrative detention.
Whilst there are perhaps some arguments to be made for better humanitarian
protection of refugees in an encampment type situation, most critics agree that this
would severely curtail the basic tenets of free movement, work and study that asylum
seekers still have under the 1998 law. The White Paper itself acknowledges that
any “camps in our context would create serious logistical, security and humanitarian
problems,” yet this is not juxtaposed to the idea of processing centres. On this
UNICEF however took a more proactive role: given the large numbers of displaced
person across the world at historically high levels, they are only able to provide
support to the most vulnerable in South Africa, and thus are in no position to
fund such a venture. Moreover, according to a UNHCR-spokesperson, “UNHCR
considers that the right to work is a fundamental right, integral to human dignity and
self-respect, and that reliance on assistance is not conducive to self-sufficiency.”
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Without UNHCR-support such processing centres cannot be created, yet at a
committee meeting for home affairs in May 2020 the DHA said they “had taken
a policy decision that refugee processing centres [are to] be established.”The
UNHCR as an institution is not in a position to vocally and publically oppose this
development, but they have so far been consistent that they do not support this
development. This highlights how the UNHCR can impose longer-term refugee
protection ideals over short-lived political ideas of approach certain issues such as
encampment.
Ways ahead
The UNHCR takes on an important capacity-building and advocacy function in
South Africa. But by design they have to remain silent.  One human rights advocate,
interviewed for our research in Johannesburg in February 2020, noted “they
(UNCHR) know their place… they are a guest of the government… they are certainly
not going to be openly hostile or antagonistic”. This means that especially refugees
frequently view them as part of the government policies, which often work to their
detriment. Refugee focus group participants in Johannesburg said they were
“confused over the mandate [of UNHCR] ” and that “we have the impression that
UNCHR is under South African Government”. In an interview with a staff member of
a human rights organisation in the border town of Musina, the respondent described
the relationship between the government and the international organisation as
“Home Affairs and UNHCR are like the same WhatsApp group, they are very
close” (Musina, March 2020). At worst therefore, through their dependence on
the government, the UNHCR-silence can be read as approval of the regressing
refugee protection. Moreover, their role is misunderstood by those that they are
assisting. This is despite the fact that in their 30-odd year existence they have taken
on important roles and supported the livelihoods of many along the way.
This tension is likely to continue with the right to work undermined by the new
changes in refugee law from last year (subject to further litigation in the courts to
rectify this). Not being able to work will increase dependency on the UNHCR for
humanitarian assistance, and increase frustration when this cannot be delivered and
with UNHCR seen co-responsible for the in-actions of the DHA. However, if the new
backlog project is successfully carried out under the assistance of the UNHCR, it
may be a chance to show how important their capacity-building and assistance can
be.
 
This post is part of the series “70 Years of UNHCR and the 1951 Refugee
Convention: Global Developments”, which is edited and published in cooperation by
the Völkerrechtsblog and the Forced Migration Studies Blog (FluchtforschungsBlog). 
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